Key exchange protocols are fundamental for establishing secure communication channels over public networks. Password-based key exchange protocols allow parties to share a secret key in an authentic manner based on an easily memorizable password. Recently, Deng et al. proposed a three-party password-based key exchange protocol in the universal composable framework in China Communications, where two users, each one of whom shares a human-memorable password with a trusted server, can authenticate each other and compute a secure session key. In this letter, we show that Deng et al.'s protocol is insecure against offline dictionary attack by any other client. Hence, the protocol doesn't achieve their aim.
Introduction
Password-based authenticated key exchange protocols are important cryptographic tools in secure communications and have been widely used in many online websites. Among numerous authentication schemes, the password-based authenticated key agreement protocols require users only to remember a human-memorable low-entropy password and share it with a trusted server. When two users want to establish a shared session key, they resort to the trusted server to authenticate each other; it is rather simple and efficient. Therefore, it has attracted much attention and a lot of three-party authenticated key exchange protocols have been proposed [1] .
The first known password-based authenticated key agreement protocol is due to Bellovin and Merritt [2] . This concept has also been extended to the three-party case [3] and the group case [4] . Nowadays, most on-line services over the Internet are based on the client/server architecture, such as Kerberos and KryptoKnight [5] . In this architecture, there is a single server to serve a lot of clients. Authentication is basic and is the first step to identify whether a remote client is authorized or not. After the verification of the identity, the client can be held accountable and the system can decide to give a specific access privilege. Hence the password-based authenticated key agreement protocols are well suited for the client/server architectures.
Due to their simplicity and efficiency, the password-based protocols suffer from various kinds of security problems. T. Kwon et al. [6] proposed an improved password-based authentication protocol; SeongHan SHIN et al. [7] showed an impersonation attack on that protocol. Wen et al. [8] proposed a provably secure Three Party Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol using Weil pairings; Nam et al. [9] pointed out that protocol could not resist the man-in-the-middle attack. Lu and Cao [10] presented a simple three-party key exchange protocol; an online dictionary attack was found by Guo et al. [11] . Besides the man-in-the-middle attack, which is a key threat to the DH key agreement protocol [12] , the main attacks on password-based key agreement protocols include two kinds as below:
1. Undetectable online dictionary attack: an attacker tries to verify the password in an online manner without being detected. That is, a failed guess is never noticed by the server and the client, and the attacker can legally and undetectably check many times in order to get sufficient information of the password.
2. Offline dictionary attack: an attacker uses a guessed password to verify the correctness of the password in an offline manner. The attacker can freely guess a password and then check if it is correct without limitation in the number of guesses.
Recently, Deng et al. [13] proposed a three party password-based key exchange protocol based on reference [14, 15] and declared their protocol was secure under the universal composable framework (UC-SECURE) and was the minimum among the published works. In this letter, we find that their protocol is insecure against offline dictionary attack and proposed a detailed instance to attack their scheme.
Brief Review of the UC-SECURE 3PKE protocol
In Deng et al.'s protocol, E=(E,D) is a symmetric encryption scheme, h is a pseudorandom function, G = <g> is a finite cyclic group of order a l-bit prime number q, M, N are two elements in G, where the operation is denoted multiplicatively. The system contains two kinds of roles: The trustedserver P T and the users. One user may be an initiator or a responder when they participate in the protocol. At the beginning, P T should broadcast his identity sid to all the users and wait for users' requests. The protocol is described as follows: 1. When a user P i (called the initiator) wants to initiate a key exchange process with another user P j (called responder), he sends a notice , which stands for the two users' requesting the key exchange service, chooses a random exponent x and computes the value
, then sends (flowone, X) to P j . 2. When P j , who was waiting for a flow-one message, receives a message (flow-one, X) from P i , he chooses a random exponent y and computes the value the session key ( || || || ) j i j j sk h sid P P K = , and terminates the session.
Offline Dictionary Attack on the protocol
1. j P informs that and he is going to start a key exchange process. Then he selects two random exponents r and y, computes 
Discussion
In this article, we have shown that Deng et al.'s password-based key exchange protocol suffers from offline dictionary attack. Due to the public algebraic structure exchanged between the server and the client, any password-based key exchange protocols can not prevent adversaries from forging the intermediate message like X, Y, U i , U j . However, the main reason that our attack succeeds is that the intermediate messages which contain the encrypted password are not proper protected so that the attacker can verify whether the password he guessed correctly or not using the result feedback from the server. Thus, to avoid this problem, the server should make sure that the message sent from a user is unique to that user. Namely, only the server can authenticate the user, the useful message with encrypted key won't be revealed and our proposed attack is invalid.
As a conclusion, we can say, to prevent offline dictionary, the server should have the ability to authenticate that the encrypted message is unique to that user. The potential offline dictionary attack may exist on any password based protocols without authentication.
